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Abstract 
The structural change literature has documented that all countries experience 
important sectoral reallocations during their development process, namely a fall in 
agriculture, a hump shape in manufacturing and a large increase in services. Since 
the latter is the sector with the lowest productivity growth, this paper aims at 
studying if the worldwide economic growth rate will decrease in the years to come 
due to the structural change effect. To this end, it is first documented that more 
than 90% of the countries are in falling region of the manufacturing sector and 
that the worldwide share of manufactories is falling since the mid-1970s. At the 
same time, it is also showed that countries with larger manufacturing sector tend 
to exhibit faster GDP growth, especially the developed ones. However, taking the 
world as a unique economy it is also found that the fastest growing subsectors in 
services and manufacturing experience higher productivity growth than the 
service and manufacturing sectors as a whole, so this can offset for the loses in 
aggregate productivity growth due to structural change. This finding reinforces 
the balanced growth path result present in general theoretical models. Finally, 
when examining the worldwide pattern of falling of manufactures, it is founded 
that the drop occurs abruptly and exclusively during periods of economic crises, 
which may be seen as a challenge to the existing explanations for structural 
change and leaves the door open for new mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
Structural change is observed in all economies of the world and refers to the 
phenomenon of persistent and systematic variation in the ratio of the different 
sectors in the economy (agriculture, manufacturing and services1) to total value 
added2, hours worked and consumption. 
Structural change does not occur as a random or stochastic process, but presents 
some stylized facts that have been studied in early contributions by Clark (1957), 
Chenery (1960), Kuznets (1966), Syrquin (1998). In the last two centuries, the rise 
of GDP per capita has been associated with a decrease in the share of  value 
added and hours worked in agriculture, an increase of these shares in the service 
sector, and with a hump-shaped evolution of these shares in the manufacturing 
sector. That is, they are increasing for lower levels of development and decreasing 
for higher levels of development. 
One of the most interesting features of structural change is precisely this hump 
shape in the evolution of the shares in value added and hours worked in the 
manufacturing sector. When the industrial revolution began, most people 
assumed that the world had entered in the era of continued growth in 
manufacturing that would impose its dominance on the overall economy. For 
many decades the growth in manufacturing seemed unstoppable, but since the 
70’s the weight of the manufacturing sector within the economy has been falling, 
creating the hump shape that characterizes the evolution of the mentioned    
variables. 
This evolution of the manufacturing sector has important implications for the 
performance of the aggregate productivity, which in turn is the main variable that 
determines the evolution of wages and GDP per capita, Echevarria (19997). 
                                                          
1 Agriculture corresponds to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) divisions 1-5 
and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock 
production.  
Manufacturing corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 
15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate 
subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. 
 Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail 
trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and 
personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services 
2 We use indistinctly value added or GDP in constant values for referring to the  same variable 
Aggregate productivity3 is the sum of the productivity of the different sectors in 
the economy (services, manufacturing and agriculture) weighted according to the 
proportion that represents each sector in total value added. Thus, the aggregate 
productivity growth rate (hereinafter APGR) depends essentially on the 
productivity growth rate in manufacturing (hereinafter MPGR), the productivity 
growth rate in services (hereinafter SSPGR) and in agriculture, and on the 
relevance of these sectors in the economy. 
If these sectors are stable in their share to total value added and their productivity 
growth rate remains constant, this does not involve changes in APGR. But as a 
process of structural change occurs and the share of these sectors in the economy 
varies, and to the extent that productivity across sectors also differs, the APGR 
can evolve depending on which sectors gain or lose weight. 
Duarte and Restunica (2010) have investigated which is the productivity growth 
associated with each of these sectors through a sample of 29 countries for the 
period 1956-2004. For the whole sample the annualized growth rate of labor 
productivity between 1956 and 2004 has been highest in agriculture (4%), second 
in industry (3.1%) and lowest in services (1.3%). This ranking of growth rates of 
labor productivity across sectors is observed in 23 of the 29 countries of the 
sample although there is enormous variation in sectoral labor productivity growth 
across countries.  
To the extent that it is widely accepted that productivity in the service sector is 
significantly lower than that of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors together 
with the fact that services sector is increasing their weight in the global economy 
at the same time that the manufacturing sector is losing weight, it could seem 
obvious to think of the APGR will tend to the lower SSPGR, and if furthermore 
the SSPGR and the MPGR remains constant, the APGR will decrease along time 
inexorably. 
The present work aims to answer the main question: Will the APGR and so the 
GDP per capita growth be lower in the coming years due to the process of 
structural change? Thus, the present work is an empirical study of the implications 
of structural change for the aggregate income growth of countries. Its purpose is 
to analyze whether the world economy tends to a lower and lower economic 
                                                          
3
 The measure of productivity considered thorough the article is the hourly value-added based labor 
productivity according to the definition of the OECD  included in their Measuring Productivity OECD 
Manual (2001). 
growth or on the contrary we can expect a balanced growth path as the theoretical 
models predict. This study aims at answering: 
1) Whether the world has entered or not into an era of aggregate decline in the 
manufacturing share of GDP  and at which speed the global economy transits the 
downward part of the hump shape. If the manufacturing ratio has entered into 
the falling region, the global APGR and GDP per capita are likely to converge to  
the lower SSPGR. 
2)  Whether SSPGR and MPGR is actually constant, decreasing or increasing over 
time.  
3) Whether countries with larger manufacturing to GDP ratio reach larger GDP 
per capita growth rates than countries with lower manufacturing share of GDP.  
The first contribution of the article is the analysis of the structural change taking 
the world as if it were a single economy. This has been carried out adding data 
from the World Bank Database for all countries, and from the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD) for the 39 major economies.  
In addition to determine whether the world has entered the phase of declining 
industry, analyzing the global economy as a single one allows us to see what the 
patterns generated by structural change are. Thus it is possible to determine that 
the manufacturing share of GDP falls exponentially, and that structural change 
occurs abruptly and entirely in periods of crisis. This gives us indications to think 
of in new elements that promote structural change and opens the door to new 
theoretical formulations. 
The second contribution is to make a forecast of the global trend of APGR taking 
into account the effects of structural change in terms of sectors, but also in terms 
of subsectors. Forecasts relating structural change to APGR trend has been done 
on individual countries, Bah and Brada (2009) for countries from Central Europe 
which have recently entered the European Union,  but had not yet been made for 
all the world as a whole. In addition, the work formulates a specific analysis of 
structural change at subsectors level. So the services and manufacturing sector are 
broadly disaggregated into 17 subsectors to more accurately predict the future 
trend of APGR. Finally the article presents a study of the correlation between 
economic growth and the weight of manufacturing in GDP for a sample of all 
countries of the world, for which is founded a positive relationship between these 
variables. 
The article is organized as follows: In section 1, the paper analyses whether the 
world has already entered in the era of the decline in the manufacturing share of 
GDP. Section 2 studies how many countries have entered into the phase of 
declining in manufactures. Section 3 examines the velocity and characteristics of 
structural change in the downward part of the manufacturing hump shape, that is 
whether this loss of weight is linear or exponential. Section 4 examines whether 
the evolution of the growth rate of productivity in the service and manufacturing 
sectors are constant, increasing or decreasing and which evolution is predictable 
in the future. Section 5, empirically analyses whether countries with lower 
manufacturing to GDP ratio observe also lower GDP per capita growth rate 
compared with countries with higher manufacturing to GDP ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Has the world entered into an era of global decline of manufacturing? 
In this section we study in what stage is the world economy with respect to the 
phenomenon of structural change and if the world ratio of manufacturing has 
entered the downward phase of the hump shape or not. This analysis will give us 
a qualitative and quantitative information about the phase of the structural change 
in which the world stay. The world is analysed as a single economy. 
The data used are provided by the World Bank (World Development Indicators) 
and variables used are the ratio of total manufacturing to value added for all  
Members of United Nations in constant dollars (base 2005) for the period 1962-
2012. 
For each country is calculated the GDP by sectors for each year of the period 
1962-2012, then these amounts for all countries are added to get for each year the 
total amount of GDP generated by services, manufacturing and agriculture and 
we divide that sum by the total GDP. Thus we get the annual world ratio of 
sectors to total GDP (results for manufacturing sector in appendix).  
 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 % 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  =  
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖,𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖,𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
 
Figure 1  Structural change of the global economy, hump shape of the manufacturing to GDP ratio 1962-2012 
Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
 
From figure 1 it is clearly observable that since 1974 the world economy has 
entered into the era of the decline of manufacturing. Moreover, as Herrendorf et 
al (2014) shows all developed countries have entered into the downward 
manufacturing era –in relative terms- (with the exception of South Korea that 
maintains an approximately constant ratio). 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2 Hump shape of the manufacturing to total GDP ratio for the developed countries.  
Source: Herrendorf et al. (2014) 
 
The only thing that could revert this trend would be the fact that in developing 
economies such as China or India the ratio of manufacturing to GDP was 
increasing substantially. But this is not happening. In the case of China since 2006 
the manufacturing sector has also entered into the downward part of the hump 
shape and in the case of India since 2011. 
 
 Figure 3 China and India manufacturing ratio to total GDP 
Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
 
Regarding this facts we can conclude that the world has irreversibly entered into 
the downward part of the hump shape. What is up to study then is whether the 
entrance in the downward manufacturing region implies a lower APGR and 
economic growth rate.  
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2. How many countries have entered into the era of declining 
manufacturing worldwide? 
Once we know that the world taken as a single economy has entered the era of 
the decline of manufacturing, it is also possible to determine whether a majority 
of countries and their economies have also entered the phase of decline in 
manufacturing or the phenomenon of structural change only affects the most 
developed economies, i.e., the ones with highest level of GDP. 
In determining quantitatively how many countries have entered the phase of 
decline in manufacturing this foreshadow how many countries is expected GDP 
per capita growth rate progressively brings over to the SSPGR. 
To carry out this analysis we first determine for each country which is the peak 
point of the share of manufacturing to total value added. Then for the time series 
data after the peak point it is calculated the average ratio of manufacturing to total 
value added. We also use time series data for the period 1960-2013 for all 
members of United Nations provided by the World Bank. 
We classify the countries according to how much it has decreased the average of 
manufacturing to GDP ratio after the peak point compared to the peak point. 
Countries type A: The peak point is the last data of the time series and, therefore, 
the manufacturing sector is even gaining weight in the economy (16 countries) 4. 
Countries type B: the average weight of manufacturing after the peak point is 
between 0% and 5% lower than the peak point. The manufacturing sector to total 
value added ratio performs a smoothly diminishing trend. We already cannot say 
that the trend is irreversible (15 countries) 5.  
Countries type C: the average weight of manufacturing after the peak point is 
between 5% and 10% lower than the peak point. The weight of the 
manufacturing sector observes a clear diminishing trend. We can say that the 
trend is becoming irreversible (10 countries) 6. 
                                                          
4 Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Congo Rep., Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep, 
Eritrea,  Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Gabon, Ghana, Iran, Timor. 
5 Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Micronesia Fed.Sts., 
Myanmar, Panama, Peru, Swaziland, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen Rep. 
6 China, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Jordan, Lao PDR, Qatar, Senegal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia 
Countries type D: the average weight of the industry after the peak point is more 
than 10% below the peak point. The weight of the manufacturing sector related 
to the overall economy observes a clear diminishing trend. We can say that the 
trend is irreversible and that more it is consolidated for some time (139 
countries)7  
Countries excluded from the analysis: countries for which World Bank do not 
provide data (13 countries)8. 
Table 1: Average manufacturing to GDP ratio with respect to the peak point  
Countries 
Type A 
Countries 
Type B 
Countries 
Type C 
Countries 
Type D 
8,42% 
(16 countries) 
7,9% 
(15 countries) 
5,2% 
(10 countries) 
73% 
(139 countries) 
 
Source: own calculations and World Bank Database 
                                                          
7Between 10% and 20% lower (45): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, 
Benin, Cambodia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guinea, Hondura ,Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Norway, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic ,Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela RB. 
 
More than 20% lower (94): Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Japan, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia FYR, Malawi, Malta, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Paraguay, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia,  Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, 
Spain, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Togo, 
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
8 Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, The Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Korea Dem.  Rep.,  Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, 
Monaco, Samoa, San Marino, South Sudan. 
 
The results are very clear in the sense that a huge majority of countries are in the 
era of the decline in manufacturing, up to 78.2% (type C and D). Furthermore, 
these countries represent a large fraction of the global GDP. All developed 
countries are included in types C and D. 
An interesting finding related to this process is that the industry does not expect 
to reach a predetermined maximum weight with respect to GDP to begin its 
descent. While it seemed that there existed a somewhat predetermined peak point 
(around 40% of GDP) for developed countries before to start the decline, the 
peak point when we account for all countries greatly varies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. How fast is the manufacturing sector shrinking? 
Knowing what is the trend and speed that takes structural change in the 
manufacturing sector is useful to determine future projections in the weight of 
manufacturing to total GDP and to know how fast the APGR would be 
approaching to the values of the SSPGR. 
 
Figure 4 Time series of the downward part of the world manufacturing to GDP ratio 
Source: own calculations and World Bank data 
 
As we can see from time series shown in figure 4 it is clearly a non-stationary 
series. To model it, estimate and draw forecast from the time series we need to 
disentangle the nature of unsteadiness. From a first superficial inspection the non-
stationary could be determined by the presence of a trend or successive level 
shifts. 
First we analyze whether the existence of a trend could be the reason of the non-
stationarity. To adjust the trend we do regressions for the time period 1974-2012 
and for different types of possible functional forms. Here 𝑦𝑡 is the manufacturing 
to GDP ratio, 𝑡 is a variable of time and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term.  
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Table 2: analysis of the regressions with different possible functional forms 
Functional Form Performance 
 
Results 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖 
 
Linear trend with an intercept 𝐵0 and slope 𝐵1 
 
𝐵0 =39,4     p-value=2,31e-023 *** 
𝑅2= 0,93          DW=0,42 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝑢𝑖 
 
First differences, linear trend with slope 𝐵0. 
Helps us to control for autocorrelation. 
𝐵0 =−0,29      p-value=0,0109  ** 
DW=2,053 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑡
2 +  𝑢𝑖 
 
Quadratic trend. Depending on the sign of 
coefficients increasing or decreasing effects of 
time variable. 
𝐵0 =38,8 
𝐵1= −0,249    p-value=0,0002    *** 
𝐵2 =−0,0023  p-value=0,1223    
𝑅2= 0,937      DW=0,45 
log (𝑦𝑡) = 𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝑡+ 𝑢𝑖 
 
Exponential trend. An increase in one unit of 
time implies a 𝐵1x100% increase in 𝑦. 
 
𝐵0 =3,68 
𝐵1= −0,01   p-value=1,14e-022 *** 
𝑅2= 0,927408   DW=0,40 
∆log (𝑦𝑡) = 𝐵0+ 𝑢𝑖 Exponential trend in first differences. An 
increase in one unit of time implies a 𝐵0x100% 
increase in𝑦. 
 
𝐵0 =−0,0092  p-value=0,00126  ** 
DW=2,03 
 
The functional form that shows a lower p-value and avoids the presence of 
autocorrelation is:  
∆log (𝑦𝑡) = 𝐵0+ 𝑢𝑖 
 
From the regression we have obtained an statistically significant coefficient of -
0,0092 (at a 5% significance level). From the economic point of view the value of 
the coefficient -0,0092  means that for each year since 1974, where the 
manufacturing sector reached the peak point, manufacturing has lost every year 
an average of 0.92% of their ratio to total GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now we are ready to analyze in more detail the time series figure: 
 
Figure 5 Annual growth rate manufacturing to GDP ratio since 1974 
Source: own calculations and World Bank data 
 
Observing in detail figure 5 it can be drawn some interesting issues. First we can 
see how for the years that coincides with an economic crisis manufacturing sector 
loss considerable weight. This means that during the period of the crisis the 
decline in GDP by manufacturing is larger in relative terms than in the service 
sector. However, in the years after the crisis and until a new crisis occurs the share 
of manufacturing in GDP seems unchanged and oscillating around a 0 mean. 
Could it be that the adjustment in the weight of manufacturing was an abruptly 
process from shocks produced by crisis? 
It becomes necessary to contrast this hypothesis empirically. It is clear that a 
larger weight is lost in manufacturing sector coinciding with shocks caused by 
crises9. Thus we can control the regression for these shocks incorporating shift 
level dummies (one dummy for each crisis, adopting a value of 0 before the crisis 
and a value of 1 from the crisis). The regression is performed in log-levels: 
log (𝑦𝑡) = 𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝑡 + 𝐵2𝐷𝑆𝐿75 + 𝐵3𝐷𝑆𝐿 83 + 𝐵4𝐷𝑆𝐿90 + 𝐵5𝐷𝑆𝐿92
+ 𝐵6𝐷𝑆𝐿97 + 𝐵7𝐷𝑆𝐿98 + 𝐵8𝐷𝑆𝐿01 + 𝐵9𝐷𝑆𝐿09 +  𝑢𝑖 
                                                          
9
 1975 Oil Crisis, 1983 Latin American Debt Crisis, 1990 US Savings & Loans Crisis, 1992 Speculative 
attacks on European Currencies, 1997-98 Asian Crisis,  2001 Dot-com Crisis and 2008/09 World Financial 
Crisis. 
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Table 3: regression in log-levels for the time series of the downward part of the 
manufacturing hump shape 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the analysis of the regression we can find a very interesting result. Once we 
control for the significant shocks caused by crisis (8 out of 39 years) it is not 
observed any tendency in the evolution of the manufacturing to GDP ratio 
growth rate. We cannot reject the null that the parameter of interest 𝐵1  is equal 
to 0 with a large p-value of 0,81. This means that in periods between crises 
manufacturing ratio is growing similar to that of total GDP, and weight loss in 
manufacturing occurs from shocks caused by crises not offsets in subsequent 
periods. 
We can also calculate averages of manufacturing to GDP growth rate ratios for 
the between crisis periods to be confident about this statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable: d_l_ MantoGDPratio74/12 
 
 
 Coeficient Desv. Típica t-ràtio Valor p  
const 3,6422 0,0116427 312,8313 <0,00001 *** 
LS75 −0,0242568 0,0131287 -1,8476 0,07488 * 
LS83 −0,0364208 0,00971896 -3,7474 0,00079 *** 
LS90 −0,0301183 0,0103686 -2,9048 0,00696 *** 
LS92 −0,045726 0,0103385 -4,4229 0,00013 *** 
LS97 −0,101061 0,0130677 -7,7337 <0,00001 *** 
LS98 −0,0245981 0,0135465 -1,8158 0,07975 * 
LS01 −0,0338447 0,00964745 -3,5082 0,00149 *** 
LS09 −0,0472439 0,00937211 -5,0409 0,00002 *** 
Time −0,000235632 0,00101917 -0,2312 0,81878  
 
R-quadrat  0,993526  R-quadratajustat  0,991516 
 
Table 4: average of manufacturing to GDP growth rate ratios, between crisis periods 
Period  Average Manufacturing to 
total GDP ratio growth rate 
1976 to 1980 0,15% 
1984 to 1989 0,09% 
1995  to 1996 -0,37% 
 1999 to 2000 -0,02% 
2002 to 2007 0,09% 
2010 to 2012 0,61% 
Total Average Inter-Crisis Periods 
 
0,09%  
 
Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
As table 4 shows the average growth rate is positive for four periods and only for 
two periods is a little bit negative. Furthermore when we account the average of 
manufacturing to GDP growth rate in all the periods between crises this value is 
in fact positive. So from both the regression and from this calculation we can 
conclude that there is not any structural change in manufacturing sector in 
periods between crises. 
This finding can help us to better understand what the engine of structural change 
is. In recent years two different proposals emphasize different economic forces 
behind structural transformation, Kongsamut et al (2001) and Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007). The Kongsamut model assumes that different income-elasticities in 
agriculture, manufacturing and services are the engine of structural change, while 
the Ngai and Pissarides (2007) model poses that changes in relative prices and the 
fact that agriculture, manufacturing and services are complementary goods (price 
elasticity <1) are the cause of structural change. 
In the model Ngai and Pissarides (2007) while changes in relative prices occurs 
from different ratios of productivity growth across sector (it is assumed that 
productivity growth for each sector is constant). From this model it is expected 
gradual structural change. This implies a linear or exponential structural change 
trend type, but not abrupt and sudden adjustments. 
Since our calculations are made based on the deflated value added, the structural 
change represented in figure 4 only express changes in real variables. To properly 
contrast the data with this model that takes into account the change in relative 
prices as the driver of structural change data would have been represented on the 
basis of nominal values.  
Nevertheless, I think of two hypotheses can be raised to explain the structural 
change performance in the ratio of manufacturing. The first is based on the 
Kongsamut model that assumes homotheticity of the manufacturing demand as 
income grows (and non-homotheticity for the agriculture and services demand). A 
possible extension that could draw the “staircase” showed by structural change 
would be devised assuming manufacturing demand with respect to income as 
non-homothetic in times of crisis and as homothetic in periods between crises.  
Thus, in periods between crises actual consumption of manufactured goods 
would grow at the same rate than total consumption while in periods of economic 
crisis manufacturing consumption would decrease more abruptly than total 
consumption. In this respect it is known that in times of crisis the consumption 
of durable goods are particularly affected, Engel et al. (2011). Also following a 
similar reasoning the hump shape could be explained by applying a somewhat 
measure of saturation with respect to consumption in manufacturing goods 
assuming that on average income increases steadily. 
The other hypothesis that could be launched is that a combination of both 
models explains the performance of the structural change. We can think of 
periods of economic growth as periods where the manufacturing prices do not 
adjust downward to increases in relative manufacturing productivity. When a 
shock and a crisis occurs  as relative prices of manufacturing are higher than its 
equilibrium level, manufacturing consumption suffers from a dramatic break 
down (higher than the average reduction in consumption). The relative prices 
then adjust rapidly to allow for an increase on sales and when the real 
manufacturing consumption gradually achieve the prior levels, as manufacturing 
prices have decreased in relative terms, at the end of the adjustment the nominal 
value of the  manufacturing consumption represents a lower manufacturing to 
GDP ratio.  
In the transition until the end of the adjustment the increase in real manufacturing 
consumption is higher than the average increase in consumption in order to offset 
for the break down but to the extent that manufacturing relative prices have 
dropped, the nominal value of manufacturing consumption increases at the same 
rate of average consumption, so the share of manufacturing in GDP remains 
constant during the transition. 
Finally, when the economy starts a new period of economic expansion prices 
became again sticky and these will not adjust until the next shock, reinforcing the 
fact that manufacturing to GDP ratio remains constant until the following crisis. 
Let us work for future empirical and theoretical studies able to contrast this 
hypothesis. 
3.1 A possible forecast 
We can also face a possible forecast of manufacturing to GDP ratio, for instance 
18 years from 2012. In doing so we look at the trend found in the first regression 
of this section: 
∆log (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡) ≈ −0,92%+ 𝑢𝑖 
To the extent that we cannot know with certainty the future shocks that will lead 
to a sharp adjustment of the manufacturing ratio, we assume that future shocks 
will be distributed in a similar way that prior ones. Then the average weight loss 
of manufacturing will be placed around the 1% per year on average. The weight 
loss of approximately 1% annual in manufacturing to GDP ratio puts us in 
projections for the next eighteen years: 
 
Table 5 : manufacturing to GDP ratio  forecast 
Year Ratio forecast Year Ratio forecast 
2013 26,59 2022 24,29 
2014 26,33 2023 24,05 
2015 26,06 2024 23,81 
2016 25,80 2025 23,57 
2017 25,54 2026 23,33 
2018 25,293 2027 23,10 
2019 25,04 2028 22,87 
2020 24,79 2029 22,64 
2021 24,54 2030 22,42 
 
Source: own calculations 
The prediction is that in the next 18 years world manufacturing will lose 
approximately four percentage points to GDP ratio. Will this lose in the share of 
manufacturing weaken the APGR to the extent that SSGR is lower than MPGR? 
We address the answer to this question in the next section. 
 
 
 
4. Is the productivity growth rate in services constant? 
In this section we address the key issue of whether SSPGR is constant over time 
or not. This is a crucial issue in our analysis. From the above results we can 
assume that APGR is gradually approaching the values of SSPGR insofar 
agriculture and manufacturing lose weight in favor of services. 
Although it may seem to be the contrary that fact does not necessarily mean that 
APGR decreases over time. The APGR may not decrease if the SSPGR and 
MPGR were not constant and increased (one or both) up to compensate for the 
weight loss in manufacturing. 
The issue is, how can we determine if SSPGR and MPGR have a constant, 
increasing or decreasing trend? The way is by making a disaggregation of the 
services and manufacturing sectors on subsectors and analyze whether these 
subsectors have different productivities and whether are driven by patterns of 
structural change. In the presence of structural change at the subsector level and if 
it is the case that subsectors by expand their weight in the GDP are more 
productive than the sector average, the sector as a whole will gain productivity to 
the extent that when calculating the weighted average productivity growth rate 
these subsectors also would account for a higher weight and for a higher 
productivity weight. If this increase will be enough to avoid falls in APGR will 
depend on the magnitude and on the speed of the manufacturing decline. 
We are ready to address the empirical analysis to verify whether reality approaches 
any of these scenes or not. I proceed as follows: for the 39 United Nation 
members10 included in the World Input-Output database (WIOD) we obtain for 
the three broad sectors and for the period 1995-2009 the total value added, price 
levels of gross value added (base 1995), and  total hours worked by persons 
engaged. We also obtain the same data for the 17 subsectors11 in which the 
                                                          
10 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Republic of Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
11
 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, retail sale of fuel; Wholesale trade and commission 
trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, repair of 
household goods; Hotels and restaurants; Other inland transport; Other water transport; Other air transport; Other 
supporting and auxiliary transport activities; Activities of travel agencies; Post and telecommunications;  Financial 
intermediation; Real estate activities; Renting of m&eq and other business activities; Public admin and defense, 
compulsory social security; Education;  Health and social work; Other community, social and personal services; 
Private households with employed persons. 
service sector is disaggregated and the 17 subsectors12 in which de manufacturing 
sector is disaggregated. These 39 countries represent more than 90% of the global 
economy. 
With these data I calculate the deflated value added for the 39 countries, the labor 
productivity per hour worked and the average growth in productivity by sectors 
and subsectors for the period 1995-2009. It is also calculated the share of each 
sector and subsector to GDP for each year of the series to assess patterns of 
structural change in the period 1995-2009. 
Once made these calculations I can add data for the whole 39 countries to obtain 
a weighted average of all these variables. This weighted average values are a good 
proxy of the world as a whole as these countries represent more than 90% of the 
global economy. To calculate the global weighted average I determine the weight 
for each country dividing the country GDP by the sum of the GDP of these 39 
countries. Then all variables are multiplied by this ratio and added up the 
weighted values for each variable. For example, to calculate the weighted average 
of global SSPGR for the period 1995-2009: 
 
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑅1995−2009  =∑  (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖
39
𝑖=1 *
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃39𝑛=1 𝑛
) 
where   ∑
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑖
∑ 𝐺𝐷𝑃39𝑛=1 𝑛
39
𝑖=1 =1 
 
In this way I proceed with all variables of interest. With regard to the sectoral 
productivity growth and the sector to GDP ratio we obtain the following results: 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Mining and quarrying; Food , beverages and tobacco;   Textiles; Leather and footwear; Wood and and cork; Pulp, 
paper, printing and publishing; Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel; Chemicals and chemical; Rubber and 
plastics;  Other non-metallic mineral; Basic metals and fabricated metal; Machinery; Electrical and optical equipment; 
Transport equipment; Manufacturing nec, recycling; Electricity, gas and water supply; Construction. 
 
Table 6 : World sector weighted average productivity growth rates and sector to GDP 
ratio (in %) 
Variable Agriculture Manufacturing Services Total 
Av. Productivity growth 1995-2009 3,98 2,91 1,95 2,27 
 
Sector to GDP ratio 1995 
4 29,7 66,3 100 
 
Sector to GDP ratio 2002 
3,5 28,4 68,1  
 
Sector to GDP ratio 2009 
3,02 27 70 100 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
These results vary somewhat quantitatively compared to those obtained in Duarte 
and Restunica (2010) for a sample of 29 countries for the period 1956-2004: 
agriculture (4%), manufacturing (3.1%) and in services (1.3%). In agriculture and 
manufacturing are very similar but differ significantly on services productivity as is 
higher in the sample here analyzed. This could be explained by the increased 
productivity of the service sector in the period 1995-2009 compared to the 1956-
2004 period. Financial intermediation services as well as telecommunications have 
experienced in recent years a significant increase in productivity that the results by 
Restunica and Duarte (2010) collected only partially. 
A first conclusion can be drawn from these results is that the service sector has 
increased its productivity over the last two decades and therefore we can say that 
SSPGR has not been constant. In contrast, productivity in the manufacturing 
sector shows an approximate constant trend. Now we are interested in examine 
whether the future global productivity of the service sector will grow and what 
may be the behavior of the manufacturing productivity. First we look at whether 
there are patterns of structural change within the subsectors of the services sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Structural change at the subsectoral level 
First we look at possible structural change patterns within the paths of the 
subsectors of the services sector. 
Table 7: Evolution of the services subsectors (as a share of GDP) 
 
(In green the subsectors that increases their ratio to GDP in both periods 95-01 and 02-09, in 
orange the subsectors that maintains constant their ratio to GDP) 
 
Subsector 1995  
GDP (%)  
2002  
GDP (%)  
2009  
GDP (%)  
Av PGR 
95-09 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 1,32 1,34 1,49 
2,57 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 6,21 7,45 7,93 
4,17 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of household goods 5,63 5,93 5,74 
2,83 
Hotels and restaurants 
 2,63 2,63 2,40 
0,45 
Other Inland transport 
 2,59 2,47 2,28 
1,31 
Other Water transport 
 0,22 0,28 0,38 
7,31 
Other Air transport 
 0,45 0,41 0,40 
5,95 
Other Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; 
activities of travel agencies 1,15 1,16 1,21 
1,61 
Post and telecommunications 
 2,31 3,08 3,82 
6,32 
Financial intermediation 
 6,04 6,45 7,02 
3,44 
Real estate activities 
 9,66 9,37 9,70 
0,73 
Renting of m&eq and other business activities 
 8,02 9,21 10,23 
1,92 
Public admin and defence; compulsory social security 
 8,00 7,13 7,14 
1,17 
Education 
 3,27 2,98 2,78 
-0,16 
Health and social work 
 5,18 4,93 5,52 
0,93 
Other community, social and personal services 
 3,53 3,31 3,29 
0,55 
Private households with employed persons 
 0 0 0 
0,00 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD 
From table 7 we can see that for most subsectors patterns of structural change are 
clear in the sense that these subsectors grow or decrease on a continuous basis 
over time (in both periods 1995-2002 and 2002-2009). Only three subsectors 
maintain a relatively constant trend: Health and social work, Real estate activities, 
Retail Trade. 
 
 Figure 6 Structural change of growing services subsectors to GDP ratio 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Services subsectors with constant and decreasing ratio to GDP 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
Through simple calculations we can realize that the weight in the service sector of 
these increasing subsectors is of 46% while the subsectors that loss weights 
represent 23% and the subsectors that remain constant are approximately 30% of 
the service sector. The fact that the sectors that gain weight or remain constant 
represent a 76% of the service sector trigger that the services sector gains weight 
with respect to GDP as a whole. 
 
Now we look at whether there are structural changes in the manufacturing sub-
sector. 
Table 8: Evolution of manufacturing subsectors (as a share of GDP)  
 
(In green the subsectors that increases their ratio to GDP in both periods 95-01 and 02-09, in 
orange the subsectors that maintains constant their ratio, in red the subsectors that decreases 
their ratio ) 
 
Manufacturing Subsector 1995  
GDP (%)  
2002  
GDP (%)  
2009  
GDP (%)  
Av PGR 
95-09 
Mining and quarrying 1,61 1,38 1,24 0,93 
Food , beverages and tobacco 2,56 2,33 2,08 1,24 
Textiles and textile 1,17 0,97 0,75 2,62 
Leather and footwear 0,18 0,15 0,11 3,56 
Wood and cork 0,50 0,44 0,34 2,08 
Pulp, paper, paper , printing and publishing 1,75 1,54 1,31 2,34 
 Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 0,59 0,59 0,65 7,59 
 Chemicals  2,00 2,09 1,94 3,84 
Rubber and plastics 0,83 0,83 0,73 2,48 
Other non-metallic mineral 0,94 0,83 0,67 2,61 
Basic metals and fabricated metal 2,61 2,36 2,04 1,81 
Machinery 1,74 1,56 1,70 4,42 
Electrical and optical equipment 2,34 3,54 4,82 8,62 
Transport equipment 1,98 2,09 1,87 3,42 
Manufacturing nec; recycling 0,65 0,69 0,61 5,97 
 Electricity, gas and water supply 2,48 2,24 2,17 4,51 
Construction 5,68 4,98 4,36 -0,07 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
From the data we can observe in most subsectors of the manufacturing sector are 
observed patterns of structural change in the sense that growing or decreasing is a 
persistent behavior (in both periods 1995-2002 and 2002-2009). Only four 
subsectors maintain a relatively constant trend: Chemical, Machinery, 
Transportation and Construction equipment. 
 
 Figure 8 Structural change of manufacturing subsectors with decreasing ratio to GDP 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
 
Figure 9 Manufacturing subsectors with constant and increasing decreasing ratio to GDP 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
The weight in the manufacturing sector of decreasing is about 57% while the 
sectors that remain constant represent 22.7% and subsectors that gains weight are 
the 20’3% of the manufacturing sector. The fact that in the manufacturing sector 
the subsectors that lose weight or remain constant represent 79.7% is what drives 
the manufacturing sector as a whole to diminish their GDP. 
4.2 Subsectoral structural change and predicted productivity growth rate 
A way to predict trends in sectoral productivity growth is analyzing which is the 
weighted average productivity growth of the subsectors that gain weight to GDP. 
For these subsectors of the services sector the average is 2.59 percent, well above 
the services productivity growth of 1.95 per cent. Insofar, as these subsectors will  
acquire more weight in the services sector they will able to  push the service 
sector towards higher productivity. 
For the manufacturing sector the weighted average productivity growth for the  
subsectors that gains weight with respect to GDP is 9.66 per cent (very high, 
especially for electronic equipment productivity)  and clearly above the 
productivity of the manufacturing sector of 2.91 percent. Insofar as these 
subsectors will expand their weight in the manufacturing sector it will be pushed 
toward higher productivity (of course a sufficient condition is that subsectors that 
lose weight do not drop even more their low average productivity growth). 
Therefore, from the analysis of the dynamics of structural change in the 
subsectors level it can be posed the important statement that both the service and 
manufacturing sector possibly will tend to increase their productivity growth rate 
in the future. This finding is relevant to the extent that this future expected 
growth in productivity ratios can offset the negative effect on APGR of the 
reduction in the weight of manufactures. 
In fact it is what has happened since 1995. Table 9 shows how the productivity 
growth of manufacturing and services sectors has allowed APGR to not diminish 
despite the global structural change. 
 
 
Table 9 : global services sector and aggregate productivity growth rate  
(periods 1996-2001 and 2002-2009) 
 
Services Sector productivity 
growth rate  
Manufacturing 
productivity growth rate 
Aggregate productivity 
growth rate 
1996-2001:  1,92 
2002-2009:  1,98 
 
1996-2001:  2,8 
2002-2009:  3 
 
1996-2001:  2,26 
2002-2009:   2,32 
 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
From what we observe for the period 1995-2009 and from we can  expect in the 
future from the patterns of subsectors structural change, we can conclude that the 
balanced growth path the classic models embody is sufficiently  proven 
empirically and  probably will remain valid in the future. 
 
 
 
5. Do countries with larger manufacturing to GDP ratio grow at higher 
rates? 
In this section we go down from the global level to the country level to look for 
causal relation between larger share of manufacturing in GDP and GDP per 
capita growth rate. 
We address this section calculating the average GDP per capita growth and the 
average of the share of manufacturing in GDP for the period 1998-2008 (prior to 
the economic crisis to avoid the effects of shocks and because we have more data 
for this period) for all countries excluding the oil countries and mainly tourist 
countries with always less than 20% of GDP devoted to manufacturing, and 
proceed to the following regression: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐵0 +  𝐵1𝑥1𝑖 + 𝐵2𝑥2𝑖 +   𝑢𝑖 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the average GDP per capita growth rate for the period 1998-2008, 𝑥1𝑖 
is the average of the manufacturing to GDP ratio for the period 1998-2008, 𝑥2𝑖  is 
the log level GDP per capita in 1999 (that allows us to control for the fact that 
larger distances from steady state implies higher growth rates),  and  𝑢𝑖  are the 
residuals or effects of unobserved variables.  
 
 
Table 10: Testing the Manufacturing to GDP ratio and GDP per capita growth rate 
relation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
From the previous regression a concern arises in relation to compliance with the 
exclusion restriction Ε [u│x] = 0. To the extent that higher levels of 
industrialization could be correlated with a lower population growth rate which in 
turn would cause a greater increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita. The 
correlation between industrialization and lower population growth rate has been 
studied in the quality-quantity leading model Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), which 
 
Dependent variable: AllCGDPpercapitaGRAv9908 (n = 114) 
 
  Coeficient Desv. Típica t-ràtio Valor p  
const 2,05155 1,54164 1,3308 0,18599  
AllCMantoGDPAv9
908 
0,0962039 0,0333862 2,8815 0,00475 *** 
l_AllCGDPperCapita
1999 
−0,223439 0,14002 -1,5958 0,11338  
 
R-quadrat  0,089801  R-quadrat ajustat  0,073401 
 
explains that the demographic transition occurs in an industrial and technological 
environment where the families reduce the number of children and invest more in 
their education.  
 
Thus in the previous regression the coefficient 𝐵1 could be overestimated and 
would not fulfill the ceteribus paribus requirement and causation would not be 
properly established. So we do a new regression controlling for population growth 
rate of each country. 
 
Table 11: Regression controlled for population growth rate  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations from WIOD data 
 
From this more accurate regression we actually get a slightly lower coefficient of 
0.084 instead of 0.091, but the new regression increases significantly the 𝑅2 and 
p-value is reduced significantly. As we can see from the table 11 and figure 10 the 
results show a significant coefficient relating variation in the ratio of GDP to  
GDP per capita growth rate. The value of the coefficient means that when 
manufacturing ratio increases one percentage point the GDP per capita growth 
rate increases by a 0.084 percentage points. In other words, a difference of ten 
percentage points in the weight of manufacturing between two countries would  
imply a 0,84 percentage point less in GDP growth rate for the less industrialized 
country.  
 
Dependent variable: AllCGDPpercapitaGRAv9908 (n = 114) 
 
 Coeficient Desv. Típica t-ràtio Valor p  
const 7,30701 1,60664 4,5480 0,00001 *** 
AllCMantoGDPAv9
908 
0,08127 0,0292386 2,7795 0,00640 *** 
l_AllCGDPperCapit
a1999 
−0,643824 0,140944 -4,5679 0,00001 *** 
AllCPopGRAv9908 −1,27649 0,213377 -5,9823 <0,00001 *** 
 
R-quadrat  0,313237  R-quadrat ajustat  0,294507 
 
 Figure 10 Correlation between GDP per capita growth rate and Manufacturing to GDP ratio (Av. 99-08) 
Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
 
 
 
We run the same regression for the seventeen13 most developed countries:  
Table 12: developed countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Netherland, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Dependent variable: GDPpercapitaGRAv98/08 
 
 Coeficient Desv. Típica t-ràtio Valor p  
const −1,73524 1,51197 -1,1477 0,26908  
ManGDPratioDevC 0,134431 0,054318 2,4749 0,02575 ** 
 
R-quadrat  0,289945  R-quadratajustat  0,242608 
 
 We can also show the corresponding correlation graphic between GDP per capita 
growth rate and manufacturing to GDP ratio for the developed countries: 
 
Figure 11 Correlation between Manufacturing to GDP ratio and GDP per capita growth rate (1999-2008) 
developed countries. Source: own calculations from World Bank data 
 
 
Here the results show the same qualitatively, but quantitatively the coefficient is 
economically more significant and increases until 0.13. Among developed 
countries large manufacturing to GDP ratio implies higher increase in GDP per 
capita growth rate than when we analyze altogether all the countries of the world.  
With respect to developed countries the results do not change when we control 
for population growth rate or initial GDP per capita level as the values of these 
variables are similar among developed countries. 
These regressions denote that those countries able to maintain a high level of 
industrialization will maintain higher economic growth ratios. When we take the 
global economy as a unique economy the weight loss of manufacturing is an 
irreversible fact, but that does not necessarily occur in all countries in the same 
way and at the same speed. Aspects such as economic specialization, international 
trade or consumer preferences may determine that a country holds a higher 
industrialization level than others. This is for instance the Korea’s case. 
Similarly, in the global economy the decline in manufacturing does not mean 
necessarily that APGR will be affected, but at the country level, as the regression 
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do not account for weighted average14 and instead each country accounts the 
same in the regression, it seems that the rate of manufacturing in GDP is actually 
relevant for the evolution of the APGR and the GDP per capita growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 For instance US accounts for 30% of the global economy, so what is happening only in the US 
can  fairly influence the weighted average. 
Conclusions 
 
The empirical work carried out by this article has enabled to first determine a 
pattern of structural change in the world taken it as a single economy. This has 
allowed to know that the world entered the era of the decline of the 
manufacturing some decades ago, concretely in the mid 70th began the decline of 
manufacturing to GDP ratio. 
Secondly, an analysis of the structural change phenomenon in all countries of the 
world has allowed in determining that about 90% of the countries are in the 
downward phase of the manufacturing hump shape and that there is not a 
minimum peak point that has to be reached prior to begin the decline in 
manufacturing. The level that manufacturing reaches prior the onset of the 
diminishing trend greatly varies between countries. 
Third, it has been addressed the impact of structural change in the global 
aggregate productivity growth rate. The loss of weight for manufacturing with 
respect to services and the fact that manufactures have a greater ratio of 
productivity than services, can lead to think of structural change as forcing a 
decrease in APGR. Empirical data do not confirm this harsh prognosis. 
The reason is that in recent years both the MPGR and the SSPGR have increased 
offsetting the negative impact of structural change on APGR. In the future, 
productivity ratios of services and manufacturing probably still will go up because 
the subsectors that increase their relative weight in GDP are more productive 
than the sector average. This expected increase in productivity in manufacturing 
and services probably will be able to avoid a slowdown of the global APGR. 
Four, at the country level we have found a correlation between the weight of the 
manufacturing sector in the economy and the growth of GDP per capita even 
controlling for initial levels of GDP and population growth rate. This indicates 
that apart from what occurs in aggregate levels for most countries structural 
change can affect the APGR.  
Five, the article address a careful analysis of the downward part of the 
manufacturing hump shape and it is clear that structural change does not occur 
with trend but through continuous shocks that impact in periods of economic 
crisis. This finding suggests extensions of the main theoretical models that explain 
the structural change. On the one hand through the incorporation of non-
homothetic preferences in consumption of manufactured goods in times of crisis 
and on the other through the incorporation of some measure of stickiness in 
prices during periods of economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 
World manufacturing ratio to total GDP 1962-2012 
 
 
Year 
 
Ratio manufacturing to total 
GDP 
Percentage 
increase/decrease 
 
 
Remarkable fact 
1962 26,57   
1963 28,04 5,52  
1964 28,02 -0,06  
1965 30,21 7,81  
1966 31,48 4,20  
1967 30,97 -1,63  
1968 32,13 3,75  
1969 33,27 3,56  
1970 35,89 7,87  
1971 37,02 3,14  
1972 37,05 0,08  
1973 37,63 1,56  
1974 38,17 1,43 Peak Point of the Hump Shape 
1975 37,34 -2,16 Oil Crisis 
1976 37,44 0,27  
1977 36,84 -1,61  
1978 36,64 -0,54  
1979 37,19 1,49  
1980 37,77 1,57  
1981 37,68 -0,23  
1982 36,82 -2,29 Latin American Debt Crisis 
1983 36,01 -2,20 Latin American Debt Crisis 
1984 36,25 0,66  
1985 36,05 -0,54  
1986 35,43 -1,72  
1987 35,56 0,36  
1988 35,23 -0,92  
1989 36,20 2,76  
1990 34,84 -3,78 
Early 90’s Crisis (US 
savings&loansCrisis) 
1991 34,60 -0,67  
1992 33,93 -1,94 
Speculative attacks on European 
currencies 
1993 33,37 -1,64 
Speculative attacks on European 
currencies 
1994 32,93 -1,32  
1995 32,79 -0,44  
1996 32,69 -0,31  
1997 29,93 -8,43 Asian Financial Crisis 
1998 29,28 -2,19 Assian Financial Crisis 
1999 29,04 -0,82  
2000 29,26 0,76  
2001 28,29 -3,30 Bursting of dot-com bubble 
2002 27,77 -1,86  
2003 27,81 0,16  
2004 28,15 1,21  
2005 28,33 0,63  
2006 28,62 1,03  
2007 28,45 -0,59  
2008 28,06 -1,35 Global Financial Crisis 
2009 26,38 -5,99 Global Financial Crisis 
2010 26,97 2,24  
2011 27,17 0,72  
2012 26,87 -1,10  
 
